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Abstract 
 
Using time-series cross-section data on state-level registration and turnout, "motor voter" 
registration programs mandated by the National Voter Registration Act are found to be effective in 
enhancing voter participation in the states that have already adopted them.  A "duration" 
specification for motor voter is introduced as an alternative to a simple dummy variable 
specification, as the typical length of states'  driver' s license renewal cycles implies that not all 
drivers have had an opportunity to register via motor voter until several elections after 
implementation of the program.  Registration effects are estimated to reach about 13 percentage 
points, with a turnout impact of roughly half of that level.  As very few states to date have "mature" 
programs in effect, most of this potential impact of motor voter has yet to be realized.  Little 
evidence is found that mail-in or agency registration, also mandated by the NVRA, affect 
participation rates.     
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I. Introduction  
 Despite the abolition of poll taxes and literacy requirements in the mid-1960s, the drastic 
reduction of residency requirements in the early 1970s, and relaxation of other registration 
requirements, voter turnout in recent U.S. presidential elections has been substantially lower than in 
the 1950s and 60s.  This decline in presidential-year voting turnout -- partially reversed in the 1992 
election -- led to increased support among lawmakers for further registration reforms designed to 
stimulate greater participation.  These efforts culminated in passage of the National Voter 
Registration Act (NVRA), signed into law by President Clinton on May 20, 1993.1  The NVRA 
mandates, for all states without election-day voter registration, the establishment of mail-in and 
agency-based registration programs, and eliminates the purging of registrants solely for nonvoting.  
A last-minute provision inserted by congressional Republicans requires armed forces recruitment 
offices to offer voter registration.  The key feature of the NVRA, however, is the "motor voter" 
provision for registering drivers'  license applicants, which is widely expected to have the greatest 
potential for adding new names to the voter rolls.  The NVRA requires that "each State shall include 
a voter registration application form for elections for Federal office as part of an application for a 
State motor vehicle driver' s license."  A single combined form may be used; where two forms are 
used, the voter application form must be automatically supplied with the driver' s license application, 
and may require only a minimal amount of information from the applicant.   
 This paper analyzes state-level registration and turnout over the 1976-1992 period, finding 
strong evidence that the motor voter programs currently in effect in many states have succeeded in 
raising registration and turnout levels.  The NVRA mandates "active" motor voter programs, in 
which all driver' s license applicants are offered an opportunity -- either orally by office personnel or 
by a question on the drivers license application or renewal form -- to register to vote.  These 
                     
    
1
See Public Law 103-31, 103d Congress.   
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programs are found to be particularly effective in registering voters, in contrast to "passive" motor 
voter programs prevailing in some states, by which voter registration forms are merely available on 
countertops or upon specific request by a driver' s license applicant.    
 Most states require renewal of a driver' s license only every 3 to 5 years, or even longer for 
some states.  Because of this lengthy driver' s license cycle, motor voter programs are distinguished 
by their age in this study.  Evidence is found that the maximum impact of motor voter on 
registration rates is not felt until at least several elections subsequent to its implementation.    
 Mail-in registration shows few signs of working, confirming the findings of others (e.g., 
Teixeira, 1992).  No evidence is found for the proposition that agency-based registration systems 
have increased registration or turnout in the states in which they have been in effect.  The absence 
of provisions for purging registrants solely for nonvoting is associated with higher registration rates 
under some model specifications, but no turnout effects are found, suggesting that purged names 
represent primarily "deadwood" registrants who are deceased or no longer residing in the 
jurisdiction.     
 
II. Data and Methodology   
 A previous analysis of motor voter and mail-in programs over the 1972-88 period by Crocker 
(1990) found mixed results: motor voter states had somewhat higher registration and turnout than 
non-motor voter states, but presidential-year turnout continued to decline in a majority of motor 
voter states following implementation of the programs.  Mail-in provisions were found to be 
associated with reduced registration and turnout, in either a with/without comparison of states or a 
before-and-after analysis of states adopting mail-in registration.   
 Unfortunately, only highly tentative conclusions can be drawn from these simple 
comparisons of means.  Crocker (1990, p. 43) acknowledges that a more rigorous test of these 
electoral innovations would require controlling for other variables that affect state-level voter 
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participation rates. 2  For example, states of the Old Confederacy have long had substantially 
below-average voting rates.  Because North Carolina was the only southern state with motor voter 
during the period covered by Crocker' s analysis3, a simple comparison across groups of states with 
and without motor voter may greatly exaggerate its apparent impact.  As Crocker (1990, p. 8) 
cautions: "Such a comparison makes the assumption that the only differences among the states, 
relevant to registration and turnout rates, are the voter registration systems."   
 A simple before-and-after comparison of participation rates in states adopting new programs 
contains similar flaws to the simple comparisons across groups of states.  As Crocker (1990, p. 7) 
notes, his before-and-after analysis showing a turnout decline in states adopting motor voter 
"assumes that no other major changes, which can affect registration and turnout, are taking place at 
the same time."  Perhaps the adoption of motor voter in certain states prevented their turnout rates 
from falling even further than they actually did.  
 The present study adopts Crocker' s basic approach of estimating the future impact of the 
NVRA on voter participation, making use of the fact that most of the key provisions required by the 
NVRA have already been widely -- but not universally -- implemented by state law.  Thus, 
participation rates in state-year observations with a particular provision in place can be compared to 
those in the "without" state-year observations.  This study, not being constrained methodologically 
-- as was Crocker' s -- by the requirement of being comprehensible to our elected officials, employs 
standard regression techniques by which regional and state-specific effects can be controlled for.  
 State-level data on registration and turnout rates for the period 1976-1992, collected by 
Elections Data Services, are used to test the effects on participation rates of liberalized registration 
                     
    
2
Crocker's study was intended for a lay readership of congresspersons and their staffs.  
    
3
North Carolina adopted and implemented motor voter prior to the 1984 election, but thereafter the program was 
virtually abandoned under the state's Republican administration, as few driver's license applicants were asked by clerks if 
they wished to register (no question was included on the application form).  Since the 1988 election, North Carolina 
re-instituted an "active" program  and Texas became the second former Confederate state to adopt one.    
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procedures contained in the NVRA.  With nine national elections held over this period, there are 
nine observations on each state for both registration and turnout.4 
Pooled time-series cross-section models are employed, with state and year dummy variables.  These 
procedures combine the advantages of before-and-after comparisons with those of with-and-without 
analysis, and eliminate the major disadvantages of each: differences across states, and within each 
state over time, can be controlled for.  For each election years between 1976 and 1992, each state is 
coded for whether or not motor voter, mail-in registration, etc. were in effect at the time. 5  
 Numerous factors in addition to registration laws that may influence electoral participation 
rates are controlled for.  Dummy variables for the presence of Senate and gubernatorial races on the 
ballot are included, as is the proportion of the state' s seats in the House of Representatives that are 
contested by both major parties.  The competitiveness of the presidential election is represented in 
turnout equations by the state' s vote margin separating the two major party candidates.6   
 Economic conditions may affect voter participation through various channels (e.g., see 
Rosenstone, 1982).  Per capita income and unemployment are thus included in the registration and 
turnout models.   
 Demographic variables such as residential mobility, percent homeowners, percent college or 
high school graduates, and median age of a state cannot be included here because of limited data 
                     
    
4
The District of Columbia is included as a state.  Elections Data Services does not provide registration data for 
North Dakota and Wisconsin, as the former and some rural counties in the latter do not require registration.  These states 
are omitted in analyses of registration, yielding an N of 441 (51*9 - 9*2).  North Dakota is also omitted from turnout 
analyses, as several key independent variables -- mail-in, motor voter, etc. -- are not meaningful for a state without 
registration.  Louisiana had no general elections in 1978 or 1982, yielding an N of 198 (51*4 - 4 - 2) for midterm turnout, 
and 250 (51*5 - 5) for presidential turnout analyses.  
    
5
The appendix lists the programs in effect in each state as of the 1992 election.  
    
6
Cox (1988) explains why this measure is preferable to the percentage vote margin.  Results are not 
substantively different when the latter is substituted, with or without voting age population included to control for 
number of votes represented by the percent margin.  The square of raw vote margin was dropped after showing no 
significant effects in any specifications.    
  
 
 6 
availability, as the Census Bureau collects these state-level data only every ten years.  However, to 
the extent that the relative values of these demographic variables change only slowly over time across 
states, their effects on voter participation will be largely captured by state dummy variables.7  To the 
extent there are nationwide trends--for example, in average education--they will be largely captured 
by the year dummies.    
 Most previous regression analyses of turnout and registration employ a single cross-section 
of data.  This study uses a "least-squares dummy variables" or "fixed-effects" approach, in which 
state dummy variables are included to net out state-specific constant-over-time influences that, in 
tests of a single cross-section of data, may bias the estimated effects of registration laws by 
influencing turnout levels and the passage of relaxed registration requirements.   
 Even in analyses of survey data, unmeasured state effects may lead to biased coefficient 
estimates in a single cross-section, as acknowledged by Teixeira (1992, pp. 122, 124).  For 
example, when the state-level turnout rate is coded into survey data, this variable remains a powerful 
predictor of individual-level turnout despite inclusion of a wide variety of state-level electoral 
provisions and individual-level demographic and attitudinal measures in the model. 8  
 Registration closing date is illustrative of the endogeneity problems in cross-sectional turnout 
studies.  Registration and turnout are almost invariably shown in cross-sectional analyses to be 
strongly and inversely correlated with the number of days before election day that the registration 
rolls are closed: the sooner in October (or November) the deadline for registering is, the fewer 
                     
    7Certain registration provisions such as evening and Saturday registration, regular registration office hours, and 
allowing deputy registrars are not included in the model due to some indications the available data are not sufficiently 
reliable over the full period considered here.  These provisions appear to have changed relatively little since 1976, so 
that fixed state effects will capture most of their impacts (which appear to be minor in cross-sectional studies; e.g., see 
Teixeira, 1992, pp. 122-3).  Residency requirements were drastically reduced in the early ' 70s, have changed very 
little since 1976, and apparently have little remaining impact on participation following their reduction (Conway, 1981).    
    
8
Results available from author on request.    
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registrants there are.9  Crocker (1989, p. 12) notes that turnout in states permitting registration on 
election day (i.e., a closing date of zero) exceeded that in states without election-day registration by 
12 to 14 percentage points in each of the 4 presidential elections between 1976 and 1988.  However, 
as Crocker points out, "the particular states with election day voter registration systems have always 
been higher turnout states" and turnout in fact declined in these states as a group following the 
adoption of election-day registration.  State-level turnout and the adoption of liberal registration 
practices could conceivably both be related to some underlying cause which studies have not been 
able to quantify, such as a relatively strong "participatory culture."10  If so, the apparent effects of 
closing date on registration and turnout will be exaggerated in simple cross-sectional analyses, by 
capturing part of the impact of the unmeasured underlying variable.  To the extent that any such 
unmeasured underlying factors are roughly constant over the period studied, a pooled time-series 
cross-section design with state dummy variables will net out these state effects that otherwise bias the 
coefficient of closing date.   
 Other sources of endogeneity may conceivably bias the coefficients of certain variables in the 
opposite direction.  For instance, using 1990 NES data one finds participation rates are lower in 
states that declare election day a state holiday.11  While participation could be reduced by people 
taking advantage of the holiday to leave town,12 it is at least as likely that many states that have made 
                     
    
9
E.g., see Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Boyd (1986), and Teixeira (1992), all of which employ survey data 
on turnout; Kelley, Ayres and Bowen (1967) obtain a similar finding for closing date with city-level registration data.  
     
    
10
States closing voter registration books earlier tend to have lower mail-in response rates for the 1990 U.S. 
Census, while states with motor voter programs tend to have higher census response rates (along with higher per capita 
incomes).  There is of course no direct causal relation between census response (or other forms of non-electoral citizen 
participation) and electoral laws, but the fact they are correlated indicates some unmeasured variable may account for 
both. 
  
    
11
Results available on request from the author.  
    
12
See Teixeira (1992, pp. 143-144) for a skeptical view of the potential for election-day holidays to raise turnout.  
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election day a holiday have done so partly out of concern over poor turnout rates. 
 This analysis follows Crocker' s in differentiating "active" motor voter programs from 
"passive" programs, and extends this distinction to mail-in programs.  Previous studies treating 
mail-in as an either/or proposition (e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Mitchell and Wlezian, 
1989; Crocker, 1990) overlook potentially important differences in the administration of mail-in 
registration systems across states.  For example, the forms are available at post offices, libraries and 
elsewhere in certain states, but not in others, and the programs are more heavily publicized in certain 
states than in others.  Many states require mail-in forms to be notarized and/or witnessed.  
"Active" mail-in programs are here defined as those requiring neither the witnessing nor the 
notarization of mailed registration forms, while "passive" programs require either or both.  The 
choice of this characteristic to differentiate active from passive programs is dictated in part by data 
availability: there is much less information available on how widely the various states distribute 
mail-in forms than there is regarding witnessing and notarization requirements by states.  The 
distinction can also be defended on grounds of policy relevance, however, as NVRA backers 
believed anything more than self-attestation would substantially weaken the effectiveness of mail-in.  
They succeeded in including a stipulation that mail-in forms "may not include any requirement for 
notarization or other formal authentication," such as witnessing (Public Law 103-31, 103d 
Congress), despite strong objections among opponents in Congress concerning the added potential 
for fraud.   If such requirements are burdensome, then the states with "active" mail-in should show 
higher registration and turnout, other things equal, than "passive" mail-in states, which in turn are 
hypothesized to show higher participation rates than states with no mail-in programs at all.  
 "Active" motor voter states are defined as those in which applicants for driver' s licenses are 
asked either by employees, or via an item on the application form, if they wish to register to vote.  
This definition is consistent with the version of motor voter required by the NVRA. 
 "Passive" motor voter programs are defined as those in which, at best, forms are merely 
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available on tables or countertops or upon specific request by patrons.  These programs are coded 
for the states over the 1976-92 period using information provided by the 100% VOTE project of 
Human Serve (an organization advocating and assisting states with registration reform), 
Congressional hearings reports, and state election administrators.13  As with mail-in programs, the 
expectation is that registration in states with active programs, controlling for other influences, 
exceeds that in passive states, which should in turn show higher rates than states with no motor voter 
programs at all.    
 In addition to adopting the active-passive distinction employed by Crocker (1990), this study 
introduces a "duration" rather than a dummy specification of motor voter programs.  In contrast to 
other registration provisions, not everyone in a state is immediately influenced by motor voter.  
Driver' s license renewal cycles last up to 6 years or more in some states.  Thus, the impact on 
registration and turnout should increase with time, at least for the first few elections following the 
implementation of the program.  "Motor duration" is defined as the number of consecutive 
elections, presidential and midterm, including the "current" election, for which an active motor voter 
program has been in effect.  For example, Michigan implemented motor voter in 1975 and is coded 
1 for 1976, 2 for 1978, etc.  Beyond some point, say, 6 or 8 years, all but new driver' s license 
applicants will have been exposed to motor voter, and its impact will stabilize.  The square of 
"motor duration" is included in regressions to capture this expected levelling-off pattern.14   
 Agency-based registration programs can in principal be categorized as "active" or "passive" 
just as with motor voter.  However, there were no agency-based programs in which all patrons were 
asked by employees or on application forms if they wished to register until Minnesota adopted such 
                     
    
13
Codings differ in some instances from Crocker's (1990), as 100% VOTE documented several errors in his 
classifications.  
    
14
The log of "motor duration" might appear a preferable specification, as the squared term allows the impact to 
turn downward past some point, rather than merely levelling off.  However, for most state-year observations in the 
sample, the value of "motor duration" is 0, the log of which is undefined.    
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a program prior to the 1988 election, and there were still very few as of the 1992 election.  Because 
of this lack of variation in the data, separate variable for active and passive agency-based programs 
cannot be reliably tested, and a single variable will thus be included to represent all agency-based 
programs.   
 
III. Effects of NVRA Variables on Participation Rates 
 The effects of NVRA provisions on both registration and turnout rates are examined in this 
analysis.  Registration laws influence turnout only indirectly through their impact on the decision to 
register.  From a statistical point of view, registration is thus the preferred dependent variable.  As 
turnout is one step removed from the registration decision, there is more potential for noise to be 
introduced in analyzing the effects of registration laws if turnout is instead used as the dependent 
variable. 15   Turnout may nevertheless be a useful check on results obtained from looking at 
registration rates, because of the possibility that state dummy variables and purge laws fail to fully 
capture differences in the proportion of "deadwood" on the registration rolls in state-level data.  
Deadwood registrants -- those who are deceased or who have moved and may be registered 
elsewhere, whose names nevertheless remain on the books -- comprise on average 10 to 15 percent 
of the names on the official state registration rolls, with this percentage believed to vary widely 
across the states (Piven and Cloward, 1989, p. 582).  Estimating effects on turnout directly as well 
as on registration is also advisable because it is not clear that finding sizeable effects on registration 
rates would imply anything about turnout effects: people registering via motor voter who would 
otherwise not register won' t necessarily show up at the polls on election day.  Effects on turnout 
cannot be estimated simply through multiplying the registration increase by the percentage of 
registrants who currently vote, as marginal registrants may vote at rates substantially below those of 
                     
    
15
See Cook and Tauchen, 1984.   
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the average registrant (for evidence from California, see Cain and McCue, 1985).  The District of 
Columbia found that nearly 60% of registrants who had registered by traditional means voted in the 
1990 elections compared to only 30% turnout among those who had registered via motor voter.     
 Advocates of the NVRA have predicted that registration rates would exceed 90% or even 
95% with motor voter, mail-in, and agency registration fully implemented.  These forecasts assume 
that virtually everyone reached by these programs will choose to register; empirical analyses such as 
this one would thus only need to examine turnout effects, as the only interesting question would then 
be how many of the new registrants actually show up at the polls.  Anecdotal and statistical evidence 
indicates, however, that many Americans fail to register not merely because of the inconvenience, 
but also out of fear that their registration information will be used for juror selection and other 
non-electoral purposes (Knack, 1992, 1993).  For citizens intent on avoiding jury duty, making it 
easier to register via motor voter or other programs will obviously be ineffectual until the use of 
registration lists for juror selection purposes is abandoned.  Near-universal registration following 
passage of the NVRA cannot be assumed, therefore, as long as many state and federal courts choose 
jurors primarily from voter registration rolls.                 
 Table 1 presents results for state-level registration rates covering the 9 elections occurring 
over the 1976-92 period.  The dependent variable is registrants as a percentage of a state' s voting 
age population (VAP).16  Models I and II in Table 1 are pooled time-series cross-sections with year 
dummies; the fixed effects regression in Model III adds state dummy variables (the coefficients for 
the state and year dummies are not shown in tables for reasons of space).  These state dummies are 
intended to capture the effects of unquantifiable (or, at least, unquantified) state-specific 
                     
    
16
Results using the logistic transformation of registration (and turnout), which confines predicted rates to the 
0%-100% interval, are nearly identical in terms of both statistical significance and quantitative importance.  
Untransformed participation rates are analyzed here so that estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as 
percentage impacts.   
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time-invariant influences such as differences in "participatory culture" across states.    
 Model II adds two variables in an attempt to measure some of these "cultural" differences: 
other things equal, registration in southern states17 is about 4.1 percentage points below the levels of 
other states, and each one point increase in state-level mail-in response rates to the 1990 U.S. Census 
is associated with a nearly one-third of a point rise in the registration rate.  With a Census response 
range from 49.6% for Alaska to 76.5% for Wisconsin, state differences in "civic duty" -- or 
whatever else Census response may be capturing -- can account for turnout differences of 8 or more 
percentage points across the states.18       
 Controlling for "South" and census response in Model II adds only modestly, however, to the 
explanatory power of Model I: 51 percent of the interstate variation in registration rates is accounted 
for by the variables in the model, rather than 46 percent.  Adding state dummy variables, in Model 
III, dramatically improves the R2 to .90. 19  Model III is arguably the preferred specification, 
                     
    
17
Defined as the former members of the Confederacy; results are nearly identical using the more expansive 
Census definition. 
    
18
Census response figures are as of April 27, 1990, just prior to the beginning of field enumeration efforts.  The 
national response rate was 63%.  The zero-order correlations between 1990 state-level census response and turnout for 
1992, 1988, and 1984 respectively are .40, .56, and .49 (all significant at .01).  Correlations with midterm turnout for 
1990 and 1986 with Census response are positive but not significant.  "South" and census response each retain strong 
significance in voter participation equations, despite the fact that Virginia is the only former Confederate state with an 
above-average census mail-in rate (68.4%).  The South averaged more than 4 points lower than the non-South 
(significant at .01).   
       
    
19
The fixed effects model estimates the impact on registration of changes over time in the values of the 
independent variables for states; since a southern state in 1976 is still a southern state in 1990, the variable "South" is not 
specifically included.  Since only one data point (1990) is available for state-level census response, there are no changes 
over time in this variable either.  These proxies for political culture are implicitly included in Model III, however, in the 
state dummy variables, which capture their effects as well as those of all other constant-over-time state-level influences 
on participation.  Arbitrarily choosing Wyoming -- the last alphabetically-ordered state -- as the reference state, there are 
20 state effects that are positive and significant at the .05 level (AK, AL, IA, ID, IL, IN, MA, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS, 
MT, NB, NH, OK, RI, SD, UT, VT) and 10 that are negative and significant (AZ, DC, FL, GA, HI, NC, NV, NY, SC, 
VA) in the registration equation.  In the all-years turnout equation, 4 state effects (ME, MN, MT, and SD) are significant 
and positive, while 27 disproportionately southern and border states show significant and negative fixed effects (AL, AR, 
AZ, CA, DC, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KY, MD, MI, MS, NC, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OH, OK, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV).    
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therefore, for purposes of analyzing the effects of electoral provisions--at least, for those exhibiting 
substantial change over the sample period.     
 Table 2 presents turnout results for fixed effects models for the 9 elections combined, the 5 
presidential elections, and the 4 midterm elections. 20  The model differs from the registration 
fixed-effects specification only in including a "closeness" variable, the state' s vote margin between 
the two major party presidential candidates, for the presidential elections equation.    
 
A. Motor Voter 
 Controlling for South and census response somewhat diminishes the "motor duration" 
coefficient in the registration equation, as anticipated (compare Models I and II in Table 1).  Part of 
the higher registration rates associated with motor voter turns out to be an artifact of motor voter 
states being almost exclusively non-Southern states.  Controlling for state effects (Model III), the 
"motor duration" coefficient increases while the squared term attains statistical significance.21   
 Table 3 indicates how the impact of "active" motor voter on participation rates cumulates 
over time.  As expected, the percentage-point impact on turnout is found to reach its maximum by 
the 4th or 5th election following implementation.  For registration, the peak is reached at the 6th 
election following implementation.  While turnout effects appear to turn sharply downward past the 
                     
    
20
The pooling of presidential with midterm elections is somewhat dubious with turnout -- which rises in 
presidential years much more than does registration -- as the dependent variable.  While year dummies will pick up the 
surge effects associated with the presence of a presidential election on the ballot, the implicit assumption is that the 
participation effects of the other independent variables -- such as the presence of a Senate race on the ballot -- remain 
constant from midterm to presidential years.  Clearly, the structure of the turnout equation may in fact differ 
substantially from one case to the other: e.g., the presence of a Senate or gubernatorial race on the ballot may be of little 
consequence for turnout in presidential years if most people interested in these races are planning to vote in the 
presidential contest anyway. 
  
    
21
Iowa' s motor voter program registers only first-time driver' s license applicants, not renewals.  Re-coding 
Iowa as a "passive" motor voter state does not increase the estimated impact of "active" motor voter, however, in 
turnout or registration regressions (on the other hand, the coefficients on "passive" motor voter rise somewhat).   
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6th or 7th election, estimates for 6 or more elections are largely out-of-sample extrapolations, as 
Michigan was the sole "active" motor voter state until prior to the 1984 election.  Estimates for the 
4th or 5th election are thus likely the most appropriate for gauging the performance of motor voter.   
 Employing a simple dummy variable specification for motor voter, as in Crocker (1990), 
underestimates the impact of these programs, due to their newness in many states.  For registration, 
the dummy variable substitute for "motor duration" and "motor duration2" indicates a mere 6.1 
percentage-point impact on registration, as opposed to the 13-plus points indicated by the duration 
specification (see Table 3).  For turnout for all 9 elections, and for the subset of presidential 
elections, the dummy version also understates the efficacy of motor voter.  When differences in the 
age of motor voter programs across states are taken into account, the estimated presidential-year 
turnout impact rises from 2.1 percentage points to nearly 4 points.   While even the 
duration-based estimates are perhaps disappointingly modest for the more optimistic advocates of 
registration reform, they reject the not uncommon view that participation is insensitive to how 
convenient the process of registering is.  They also reject the skeptical view that most registrants 
signed up via motor voter won' t bother to turn out on election day; these estimates suggest that 
roughly one-half of them will.      
 An unexpected result is the larger estimated impact on midterm than on presidential-year 
turnout (Tables 2 and 3).  On the surface, this finding may appear plausible, as there is a larger pool 
of nonvoters in midterm elections that may be affected by a new stimulus to vote.  However, motor 
voter affects turnout only through registration; if these new registrants are at all similar to other 
registrants, they can be expected to vote more frequently in presidential than in midterm elections.  
No explanation is offered here for the inability to confirm these expectations.    
 The effects of "passive" motor voter -- which requires at least a minimal degree of initiative 
on the part of would-be registrants -- are, predictably, relatively modest.  The strongest showing for 
a dummy variable for passive motor voter is for midterm turnout, with a 3.1 percentage-point impact 
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(Table 2), contrasted to 5.9 points for a dummy specification of "active" motor voter (Table 3).  In 
other turnout -- and even registration -- equations, the impact of "passive" motor voter falls short of 
3 percentage points.  A duration-based specification for passive motor voter does not substantially 
raise its estimated impact on participation.   
 
B. Mail-in Programs     
 The case of mail-in registration provisions provides a striking illustration of the influence of 
state dummies as controls.  In Model II of Table 1, the active version of mail-in appears to reduce 
registration by about 2.4 percentage points, while the passive version (requiring notarization and/or 
witnessing) increases it by 6 points.  The inclusion of state dummies in Model III eliminates these 
counterintuitive findings, and leaves neither of the mail-in coefficients statistically different from 0.  
In turnout equations, mail-in also exhibits little evidence of raising voting participation.  As with 
motor voter, many states adopted mail-in programs over the 1976-92 period; the poor showing of 
mail-in is thus not merely a matter of having little within-state variation for the variable in the 
sample.        
 These findings are consistent with those of several previous studies demonstrating the limited 
effectiveness of mail-in registration (e.g, Crocker, 1990; Teixeira, 1992).  When observations are 
weighted by voting-age population (VAP), however, active mail-in programs appear more 
efficacious: the registration impact (fixed-effects model) rises to a statistically significant 3.5 points, 
while the presidential turnout effect rises to a (significant) 2.2 points.  What importance should be 
attached to this result is debatable; while the California observations arguably contain more 
information than the Vermont observations, they surely do not contain anything like 40 times as 
much information.              
 Mail-in programs were categorized here as "active" or "passive" according to whether or not 
notarization and/or witnessing were required.  Insufficient information exists as to the relative 
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availability of mail-in forms across the states.  In an attempt to measure the distribution of these 
forms, mail-in provisions were interacted with agency registration, on the assumption that the forms 
are more easily obtained in states with registration forms accessible in various government offices 
serving the public.  The NVRA, in fact, requires that agencies providing public assistance and 
disability services distribute such forms.  These tests, however, found no enhanced impact of 
mail-in associated with this proxy for availability of forms.   
 "Active" motor voter states tend to also have mail-in programs: 54% of the state-year 
observations with active motor voter had mail-in registration, either active or passive, compared to 
43% of states without active motor voter (difference is significant at .06 for 2-tailed test).  Any 
potential effects of mail-in thus may be obscured by motor voter; where motor voter is registering 
large numbers of people, mail-in may add little to the registration rolls.  Regression coefficients for 
mail-in therefore may underestimate its effects in a non-motor voter state.  However, tests of a 
motor voter/mail-in interaction term show no support for such a conjecture.       
C. Agency Registration 
 Previously, agency registration has been examined only in a cross-sectional test using 1988 
CPS data, in which Teixeira (1992) found it increased the likelihood of voting by 1.2 percentage 
points.22  Similarly modest evidence for the efficacy of agency registration is found in the current 
study.  Its coefficient is negative in all 6 equations in Tables 1 and 2, significantly so in some cases.  
VAP weights reduce the magnitudes of these coefficients, leaving them statistically insignificant, but 
fail to turn them positive.  In principle, agency programs can be differentiated along "active" and 
"passive" lines, as with motor voter.  Unfortunately, too few active programs -- those roughly 
corresponding to the requirements of the NVRA -- were in effect in the sample period to reliably 
                     
    
22
Knack (1993) finds a significant and positive impact for an agency dummy for a state-level fixed effects 
specification with two data points, 1976 and 1988.  Motor voter programs were included as a type of agency registration 
in that study, however.  Here, agency registration is defined more narrowly, as in the NVRA.  
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estimate the differential effects.  These results thus do not provide a sufficient basis for concluding 
that agency programs established under the NVRA will fail to significantly influence participation 
rates.   
 
D. Purging for Nonvoting 
 The NVRA bans purging voters solely for not having voting for some specified period of 
time or number of elections; there must be in addition some evidence that a registrant has moved 
before he or she can be deleted from the rolls.  Over the 1976-92 interval, states with provisions for 
purging registrants failing to vote in a period of time show indications of lower registration rates, in 
the equations without state dummies (Models I and II, Table 1).  As few states changed their 
purging provisions over the 1976-92 period -- in sharp contrast to motor voter, mail-in, and agency 
programs -- this variable is perhaps better tested by Models I and II than by Model III, the fixed 
effects specification.  Models I and II indicate purging provisions are associated with a 3 to 4 point 
drop in registration rates.   
 In turnout equations, even in models without state dummies, the purge variable coefficient is 
generally smaller and often not significant, suggesting that most purged nonvoters have either moved 
or died.  Particularly with motor voter in place, when most would-be voters have an opportunity to 
register at extremely low cost at least once every several years, purging names from the rolls after 4 
to 8 years of nonvoting (the typical periods specified in current purging provisions) should have no 
more than trivial effects on turnout.      
   
E. Registration Closing Date 
 Two variables are used to represent closing date: a dummy variable for election-day 
registration, and a dummy for states closing their registration 28 or more days prior to the election.  
A reference category, then, is composed of those states closing registration between 1 and 27 days 
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prior to election day.   
 In models without state dummies, early closing is estimated to reduce registration by about 7 
points, while election-day registration appears to raise it by 11 points, relative to states in the 
reference category (Table 1).  The inclusion of state dummies reduces these estimates by 2 to 3 
percentage points, consistent with Crocker' s observations regarding the already-high participation 
rates of states that subsequently adopted election-day registration.  However, these fixed-effects 
estimates -- as well as those in Table 2 indicating virtually no turnout effects of closing date -- are 
based on very little within-state variation.  Only Oregon abandoned election-day registration during 
the period, while no state adopted it.  All of Oregon' s registration figures subsequent to dropping 
election-day registration prior to the 1986 election fall short of even its lowest figure for the 1976-84 
period; its turnout has not fallen, however, resulting in a significant negative coefficient for the 
election-day variable in the registration equation but not in the turnout equation.   
 Coincidentally, the three largest positive state effects in the presidential turnout equation are 
for Minnesota, Maine, and Wisconsin -- the only 3 states with election-day registration over the 
entire 1976-92 period.  This result may lead one to suspect that the fixed-effects model 
underestimates the turnout effects of election-day registration.  Yet, these state effects may well be 
capturing, at least in part, some underlying third factor or set of factors responsible for both high 
turnout and the introduction of election-day registration in the early 70s.      
 The NVRA requires the implementation of motor voter, mail-in programs, etc. only in states 
closing the registration rolls prior to election day; states could thus avoid these requirements by 
permitting election day registration.  Due to limited variability in the data, coupled with strong 
evidence of substantial unmeasured state-specific effects on the other, it is difficult to evaluate with 
much confidence the impacts on participation rates of election day registration, for comparisons with 
motor voter, agency, and mail-in.   
 An informal estimate of closing date' s impact can be obtained by comparing the 6-8 average 
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turnout lead experienced by Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Maine prior to adopting election-day 
registration with the 12-14 point average advantage subsequent to implementation.  However, 
Smolka' s (1977; cited in Teixeira, 1992) case-study approach to analyzing the effects of the reform 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin estimates a much smaller impact of no more than 2 percentage points on 
turnout.          
 Teixeira (1992) notes, in attempting to forecast the impact of motor voter, that election-day 
registration and motor voter should be close substitutes for each other in enhancing turnout: with 
either reform, no trip to a registration office is necessary; to vote only a single trip to the polls on 
election day is required.  From this perspective, a state' s choice between election-day registration 
and adoption of the NVRA provisions may thus be largely a matter of perceived administrative costs 
and potential for fraud under each alternative.   
 However, there are sources of possible differences in the impact of election day registration 
and motor voter.  The latter will not reach all potential voters, but only those who drive (or 
non-drivers who apply for an ID card from a driver' s license bureau).  On the other hand, being 
registered for a period of time prior to the election may create a psychological predisposition to vote, 
perhaps giving motor voter an advantage.   
  
F. Non-NVRA Variables 
 The Election Calendar   
 The presence of Senate, gubernatorial, and contested House races on the ballot makes little 
difference for registration rates (Table 1).  The positive effect of House races in Model I largely 
disappears with the addition of "South" in Model II; southern states predominate among states with 
relatively few House seats contested in November.  
 In Table 2, turnout effects are found for congressional races in midterm elections, with a 
Senate race adding about 1.6 percentage points.  The House race estimate is large quantitatively but 
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imprecise; the difference between none and all of a state' s House seats being contested adds 3.9 
points to the turnout rate, but large standard errors prevent these estimates from attaining statistical 
significance.  No effects for Senate races, or for a contested House race, are found for presidential 
years.   
 Surprisingly, gubernatorial races show the reverse pattern: no turnout-enhancing effects are 
found for midterm elections (the estimate is negative, sizeable, and statistically significant), but a 
governor' s race adds 2.5 points to presidential-year turnout.   
 Economic Effects 
 Unemployment is consistently, positively, and significantly associated with higher 
registration (Table 1), although the quantitative impact is fairly small.  A 1-point rise in a state' s 
unemployment rate increases registration by between four- and six-tenths of a percentage point.  
Turnout effects are smaller and insignificant, however.  Income has a significant negative influence 
for registration when state effects are excluded, but is not significant for turnout or when state effects 
are included.       
  Closeness  
 For presidential-year turnout equations, the state' s presidential contest vote margin, in 
hundreds of thousands of votes, is added to the model. 23   The (insignificant) coefficient for 
"margin" reported in Table 2 indicates a 4 million vote margin is needed to reduce turnout by only 
1 percentage point.  In a model weighting observations by VAP, "margin" is significant at .05, but 
a margin of about 1 million votes -- far larger than the number of voters in many states -- is needed 
on average to reduce turnout by a single point.  The square of margin proved insignificant and was 
dropped from the equation reported.  Controlling for voting age population, under the hypothesis 
that a given vote margin might imply (at least psychologically) a closer election in a larger state than 
in a small one, failed to improve the performance of "margin."  
                     
    
23
See Cox and Munger (1989) for a justification of this particular form of a closeness variable.   
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  Year Effects 
  Year dummies for registration are negative and statistically significantly for the 
midterm years, with 1992 as the reference year; registration is 4 to 5 points lower for the 
non-presidential elections.  Large and statistically significant year dummies in models of 
presidential-year (only) turnout indicate substantial election-specific factors influencing decisions to 
vote.  For the 1976-92 elections with 1992 as the reference year, coefficients for all other years are 
negative: 
Year    B   t 
1988   -5.7  10.67 
1984   -3.1   4.42 
1980   -3.0   3.85 
1976   -2.7   2.94 
 
These year dummies indicate strong election-specific effects pushing turnout downward in 1988 and 
upward in 1992.  The increased turnout of 1992, therefore, cannot be explained in terms of the 
spread of motor voter, higher unemployment, closeness of the election, or by other variables 
included in the model.24 
V. Conclusion    
  If the experience of states choosing "motor voter" registration programs can be generalized 
to states it is imposed on, the registration rolls will be substantially augmented in the coming years.  
Of greater importance, of course, is the finding that up to one half of these added registrants will 
actually vote, contradicting assertions by Sen. McConnell (D-Ky) and other opponents.  Where the 
active version of motor voter mandated by the NVRA has already been implemented, registration 
and turnout were significantly higher over the 1976-92 period than they would otherwise have been.  
                     
    
24
Ross Perot' s candidacy is the most obvious possible source of the turnout rise: 1 out of 7 Perot voters told exit 
pollsters when asked their 2nd vote choice that they would have abstained rather than vote for someone else (information 
provided by Voter Research and Surveys). 
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Estimating the impact of motor voter using a "duration" specification indicates that the dummy 
specification employed by Crocker (1990) understates the efficacy of motor voter, as many states in 
the sample period had only recently adopted the program.  The potential impact on voter 
participation of the various other NVRA provisions appears to be relatively minor, although 
available data do not permit a fully valid test of agency registration.     
 These estimates are not wholly free of "self-selection" bias, however.  Motor voter--as well 
as other reforms--may be more effective when mandated in the states that have not yet implemented 
them than in states already adopting them on their own, because the latter had somewhat smaller 
pools of nonregistrants and nonvoters to begin with.  Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington 
have long been high-participation states; all have adopted motor voter, while very few southern 
states have.  On the other hand, states choosing motor voter or mail-in registration on their own may 
implement it more effectively than states having it forced upon them, possibly leading to larger 
impacts in the former than in the latter.   
 A further issue receiving little or no attention, even in the more careful voter participation 
studies (e.g., Teixeira, 1992), is that of interaction among registration provisions.  In states with 
election-day or motor voter registration, for instance, mail-in may be less effective, because it is less 
needed: any potential effects from mail-in are "crowded out" by more powerful programs.  While 
no significant interaction effects among motor voter, mail-in, agency, and election-day registration 
were found in this study, one must remain cautious about assuming that estimates obtained from 
simple linear specifications using data from past elections--for which many states had either mail-in, 
or motor voter, for example, but not both--can be used to forecast participation rates for future 
elections--for which all states without election-day registration will have motor voter, and mail-in, 
and agency, and purging reform.    
 While motor voter and other registration reforms may turn out to be partial solutions to the 
problem of low voter participation in America, the inconvenience associated with registering clearly 
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cannot be blamed for the low turnout rates of the 70s and 80s (interrupted at least temporarily by the 
' 92 rise).  Registering to vote in the U.S. is currently remarkably cheap and easy by historical 
standards: literacy tests and poll taxes were banned in the early and mid-1960s, residency 
requirements were drastically cut back in the early 1970s, several states have adopted election day 
registration and many others have implemented mail-in, motor voter, and agency programs.25    
 Registration requirements are certainly more burdensome in the bulk of American states than 
in most industrial democracies, but it is clear that obstacles to registering do not fully account for 
turnout differences between the U.S. and other nations.  Even in North Dakota, which does not 
require registration, turnout rates do not exceed 70% in presidential elections.   Congressman 
Louis Stokes (D-Ohio), who supported the NVRA, has noted: "Even in developing nations, such as 
Namibia, where the people had to walk for miles, and stand in line for hours under the broiling sun, 
to vote in a free election, voter participation rates are higher than in the United States" 
(Congressional Record, 1990, H269).  The Supervisor of Elections in Orange County, Florida, 
who testified against motor voter, remarked: "At present [in Florida] it is one hundred times easier 
and quicker to register to vote than it is to obtain a driver' s license!" (U.S. Congress, House 
Subcommittee on Elections, 1989)  Although motor voter can be expected to noticeably increase 
                     
    
25
It is conceivable that a given obstacle to registering has a greater deterrent impact now than formerly, with the 
decline of political parties:  "Without the parties as intermediaries to help complete registration procedures, the `costs' of 
registration rise" (Piven and Cloward, 1988, p. 111).  If declining party-based mobilization is responsible for a rise in the 
deterrent effect of closing date, e.g., stronger parties should be associated with to a diminished effect of closing date.  I 
find the opposite to be the case with state-level electoral participation rates, using indexes of average strength of local 
party organization in the various states, circa 1979, available in Gibson et. al. (1985):  Closing date reduces registration 
by a significantly greater amount in the states with stronger parties, controlling for other variables affecting participation.  
Similarly, interacting closing date with year dummies indicates no upward trend in closing date's deterrent impact on 
participation rates.   
 Using National Elections Studies survey data instead of state-level participation data, one finds the strength of 
closing date's deterrent impact on registration and turnout no higher for persons residing in states with stronger party 
organizations, for persons who strongly identify with one of the major parties, or for persons indicating they had been 
contacted by party workers about voting.  Interaction tests of other registration laws and procedures also failed to 
support the view that a given obstacle has rising deterrent effects over time.  In personal communication, Richard 
Cloward has suggested that the mobilization proxies used here do not adequately measure the "intermediaries" believed 
by Piven and Cloward to be important.         
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American voter participation, inconvenience associated with registering cannot be the full 
explanation for our relatively low turnout.     
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Table 1: State-Level Registration, 1976-1992 
 (all midterm and presidential elections included) 
 
Model:    I (OLS)    II (OLS)  III (F.E.) 
Variable            Parameter Estimate (Standard Error) 
log per cap 
income 
   -8.825** 
   (2.474) 
  -10.630** 
   (2.611) 
    4.604 
   (4.200) 
unempl 
rate 
    0.490** 
   (0.188) 
    0.587** 
   (0.184) 
    0.426** 
   (0.156) 
guber. 
contest 
   -0.784 
   (0.747) 
   -0.947 
   (0.717) 
    1.349** 
   (0.452) 
senate 
contest 
   -0.120 
   (0.779) 
   -0.337 
   (0.745) 
   -0.008 
   (0.380) 
% congr. 
races  
    7.199** 
   (1.618) 
    2.392 
   (1.707) 
   -0.446 
   (1.399) 
election- 
day reg.  
   10.832** 
   (1.837) 
   10.751** 
   (1.761) 
    8.338** 
   (2.853) 
early 
closing 
   -7.250**            
(0.883) 
-6.806** 
   (0.854) 
   -1.551  
   (1.316) 
purge for  
nonvoting 
   -3.291** 
   (0.952) 
   -3.739** 
   (0.916) 
    2.581 
   (1.719) 
mailin 
active 
   -0.463 
   (0.921) 
   -2.376** 
   (0.924) 
    0.044    
   (1.679) 
mailin 
passive 
    5.866** 
   (1.085) 
    5.959** 
   (1.045) 
   -0.394 
   (1.108) 
agency 
registr. 
   -1.040  
   (1.671) 
   -1.206 
   (1.618) 
   -3.170** 
   (0.968) 
motor 
duration 
    3.349** 
   (0.979) 
    3.058** 
   (0.934) 
    4.462** 
   (0.625) 
motor 
duration
2
 
   -0.108 
   (0.152) 
   -0.129 
   (0.145) 
   -0.364** 
   (0.081) 
motor 
passive 
    2.360 
   (1.320) 
    2.811* 
   (1.260) 
    1.261 
   (0.796) 
South 
 
    -4.126** 
   (1.045) 
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census 
response 
     0.320** 
   (0.080) 
 
# observ.     441     441     441 
R
2
      .46     .51     .90 
 
** and * indicates significance at .01 and .05 levels (2-tail tests) respectively.   
Coefficients for year dummies in all models, and state dummies in Model III, are not shown.     
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Table 2: State-Level Turnout, 1976-1992 
 Two-Way "Fixed-Effects" Models 
  
   
Elections:     All Presdt'l Year   Midterm 
Variables    
log of per  
capita income 
    0.702  
   (4.267) 
    1.565   
   (3.492) 
   -5.310 
   (6.955) 
unemployment 
rate 
    0.268   
   (0.156) 
    0.146   
   (0.129) 
    0.337   
   (0.260) 
gubernatorial 
contest 
    1.976** 
   (0.456) 
    2.526* 
   (1.206) 
   -7.519* 
   (3.680) 
senate 
contest 
    0.934* 
   (0.380) 
    0.468 
   (0.314) 
    1.559*  
   (0.639) 
margin                
 
   -0.024 
   (0.093) 
 
% congressional 
contests  
    2.194   
   (1.403) 
    0.774 
   (1.289) 
    3.927 
   (2.327) 
election-day 
registration  
   -0.275   
   (2.776) 
    0.304   
   (2.233) 
    1.243   
   (4.582) 
early reg. 
closing date 
   -0.039               
(1.394) 
   -0.756 
   (1.054) 
    2.968  
   (2.714) 
purge for  
nonvoting 
    1.768   
   (1.499) 
    0.808   
   (1.234) 
    3.714 
   (2.435) 
mailin 
(active) 
   -0.056 
   (1.697) 
    0.424   
   (1.303) 
    4.662    
   (3.241) 
mailin 
(passive) 
    0.016   
   (1.119) 
   -0.026   
   (0.846) 
    0.909 
   (2.135) 
agency 
registration 
   -1.351  
   (0.977) 
   -1.528* 
   (0.762) 
   -0.433  
   (1.749) 
motor (active) 
duration 
    2.307** 
   (0.631) 
    1.465** 
   (0.487) 
    3.338*  
   (1.186) 
motor (active) 
duration
2
 
   -0.242** 
   (0.082) 
   -0.136* 
   (0.062) 
   -0.453** 
   (0.152) 
motor     1.494     0.738     3.067* 
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(passive)    (0.802)    (0.653)    (1.390) 
# observ.     448     250     198 
R
2
      .90     .94     .87 
 
** and * indicates significance at .01 and .05 levels (2-tailed tests) respectively.   
Coefficients for year and state dummies are not shown.     
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Table 3: Cumulative Impact of "Active" Motor Voter 
 
 
 
 
 
# of elections Registration Turnout:  
all elections 
 
Turnout: 
presidential 
Turnout: 
midterm 
1  4.10 2.06 1.33  2.88 
2  7.47 3.65 2.39  4.86 
3 10.11 4.74 3.17  5.93 
4 12.02 5.36 
 
 
3.69  6.10 
5 13.21 5.48 3.94  5.36 
6 13.66 5.13 3.91  3.71 
7 13.39 4.29 3.61  1.16 
8 12.39 2.97 3.04 -2.30 
9 10.66 1.16 2.20 -6.67 
Dummy 
variable 
estimate: 
 6.07 3.35 2.11  5.90 
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Appendix: NVRA Provisions by State, as of 1992 Election 
State Provisions  State Provisions 
AK MV ML   MT MV ML AG 
AL NP  NB ML NP 
AR   NC MV 
AZ MV ML AG   ND no reg. req' d 
CA ML NP  NH  
CT AG NP   NJ MV ML AG  
CO MV  NM MV 
DC MV ML  NV MV ML 
DE ML  NY MV ML AG 
FL   OH MV ML AG 
GA   OK  
HI MV ML  OR MV ML  
IA MV ML AG  PA MV ML  
ID MV  RI MV AG  
IL MV  SC ML 
IN   SD ML 
KS ML  TN ML 
KY ML  TX MV ML AG NP 
LA   UT ML 
MA NP  VA  
MD MV ML AG  VT MV ML NP 
ME MV ML NP ED  WA MV AG  
MI MV  WI ML ED  
MN MV ML AG ED  WV MV ML 
MO NP  WY  
MS MV ML NP      
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Notes:  
MV =  motor voter 
ML =  mail-in 
AG =  agency-based 
NP =  no purging for nonvoting 
ED =  election-day 
 
Bold indicates "active" versions of motor voter and mail-in, as required by NVRA.  
 
 
